Meet in the middle (MITM) attack is one of the most important and applicable methods for cryptanalysis of block ciphers. In this paper, a more generalized method for MITM attack is considered. For this purpose, a notion, namely cut-set, is utilized by which several numbers of MITM attacks can be performed. However, manual investigation on these cases is time-consuming and sometimes not errorfree. Therefore, a new search algorithm is also provided to obtain proper attacks in a timely manner. For examination, this new search algorithm, which could make an automated attack along with some certain ideas, is applied on HIGHT, Piccolo-128, CRAFT and AES-128 block ciphers. The least time complexities which are obtained by generalized MITM attack on full HIGHT, Piccolo-128, CRAFT and AES-128 are 2 125.08 , 2 126.78 , 2 123.25 and 2 125.53 , respectively. The results on full-round CRAFT are, to the best of our knowledge, the first cryptanalysis results in the single-key model except the designers' investigations. In addition, the results show some improvements for complexities of all the attacks, especially on HIGHT.
I. INTRODUCTION
Block ciphers are usually the main primitive used for securing communications in various technologies such as cellular networks, internet of things, and so on. Therefore, their security evaluation remains as an important concenteration point of the cryptanalysts. One of the generic methods which is always applied for security evaluation of block ciphers is MITM attack. The basic method was first introduced in [1] for cryptanalysis of DES block cipher, and then many variants and improvement techniques for MITM attack were proposed. The basic MITM attack begins from a pair of plaintext/ciphetext, say starting states, and is completed by a matching technique at the middle of a target block cipher, say ending internal/intermediate state. However, some of enhanced versions of MITM attack have focused on improving the basic attack by choosing different starting states or promotion of attack structure such as 3-subset MITM [2] , splice-and-cut [3] , and biclique [4] , [5] attacks.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Giacomo Verticale . Some ideas also have concentrated on improvements of the matching technique at the ending internal/intermediate state of MITM attack such as early abort [6] , sieve in the middle [7] or indirect partial matching [3] techniques.
Recently, automation of cryptanalysis methods has become a new important approach for two below reasons: 1) From the designers' point of view, it quickly gives the ability to ensure the security of a newly designed block cipher against various automated attacks; 2) For attackers, it rapidly gives a proper way for analyzing a target block cipher against such attacks. The MITM attack is also not an exception. As a literature review, there are various works on proposing automation procedures for different types of attacks on block ciphers, such as linear [8] , [9] , differential [8] - [11] , impossible differential [12] , [13] , MITM [13] , [14] , biclique [15] , and division property-based [16] attacks. The automation usually performs by an exhibition of a framework in which a block cipher should be defined and then it will automatically analyze the cipher and return the results. Each framework has been mostly designed for a specific attack and it does not often perform the whole attack procedure, but it usually tries to compute the attack complexities by some different or innovative methods.
A. CONTRIBUTIONS
The purpose of this paper is to express a generalized MITM attack, which can be considered as a general form of some previous attacks, in a way that it could be implemented by an automated search method. This is proposed by enjoying the notion of cut-set which was defined in [17] . Firstly, it should be cleared that how the notion of cut-set can be utilized in an attack and what its benefits are. Secondly, it should be illustrated that how the procedure of computing complexities for the attack can be automatically performed. Finally, some targetted block ciphers should be checked by the automated generalized MITM to show its performance. Although the generalized MITM attack is not limitted to any class of block ciphers, in this paper HIGHT [18] , Piccolo-128 [19] , CRAFT [20] and AES-128 [21] block ciphers are chosen as its targets. The results and comparisons are shown in Table 1 . As it can be seen in Table 1 , the lowest time complexity is for generalized MITM attack in all cases. Also, it should be noted that all complexities obtained for HIGHT block cipher are less than or equal to the previous best result. Recently, some cryptanalysis results for CRAFT are presented [25] - [27] , however, they are not on the full-round version of CRAFT and single-key model as ours.
B. RELATED WORKS
There are many related works to MITM attack on block ciphers such as [2] - [4] , [13] - [15] , [17] , but, only some of them have automation approach just like generalized MITM attack. One of them is Bouillaguet's work [28] , which has concentrated on proposing efficient basic MITM attacks on (mostly reduced-round) AES-based primitives by proposing an automatic search for recursive combinations of solvers. However, the most important one is Derbez's work [13] which helped matching part of basic MITM attack to be quickly implemented. The main idea of [13] for MITM attack is to find an equation for matching part with the lowest independent variables from the both plaintext-side and ciphertext-side. With these equations from each side, the extra computations can be omitted and the required computations can be extracted. This only works for the matching part of a basic MITM attack.
Most of the other works have focused on proposing new attacks rather than introducing search algorithms to obtain the most efficient attack.
C. OUTLINE
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: generalized MITM attack is introduced in Section II. Then, it is shown in Section III that the generalized MITM attack can cover some traditional versions of MITM attacks. In Section IV, the exact automation procedure for generalized MITM attack is explained. Afterwards, some experimental results are also provided in Section V. Finally, the conclusion is given in Section VI.
II. GENERALIZED MITM ATTACK A. BASIC ATTACK
The basic MITM attack starts from one known plaintext/ciphertext pair (P, C) and a chosen matching variable V often with the smallest size of operations in the cipher (e.g. a bit, nibble, byte or etc., say word). Then according to the partial matching technique, the matching variable V has to be computed by effective subkeys from P and C, in forward and backward directions, respectively. Therefore, suppose that the master key bits have been partitioned into three parts of common (K c ), forward (K f ) and backward (K b ) bits in such a way that partial encryption from P to V only requires (K c , K f ) bits, and partial decryption from C to V only requires (K c , K b ) bits. Assuming a fixed value for K c , forward and backward computations for calculation of the matching variable V are independent from each other. So, they should be computed and stored in a sorted format, separately. Finaly, any guessed value for master key bits with common value of matching variable from both side can be considered as a condidate for the master key.
Let C f and C b be the time complexity of the partial encryption and decryption, respectively. Then the upper bounds of time and memory complexity of the basic MITM attack are
In order to calculate more accurate time complexity, summation of each S-box complexity could be considered. The involved computational complexity for each S-box in the attack is equal to the number of guessed keys before computing that S-box. Hence, considering the complexity of non-linear parts as the dominant complexity, time complexity of the attack should be approximately equal to summation of each S-box complexity which should be normalized to the total number of S-boxes in the encryption algorithm.
B. PROPOSING GENERALIZED ATTACK
For a MITM attack, it is not mandatory to start from a plaintext or ciphertext to find the value of a matching variable in both directions. More precisely, any internal states can also be used as the starting state of the attack, while it may result in a more data complexity due to various plaintext/ciphertext pairs involved in the attack. In [17] , the notion of cut-set has been defined which can be considered as a new starting state for MITM attack. Definition of cut-set is reminded as follows:
Definition 1 (Cut-set): Let b be the block size of a block cipher. A b-bit part of the intermediate states of the cipher from which the plaintext (or the ciphertext) can be calculated completely, provided that the cipher key is known, is called a cut-set.
An example of cut-set for a 4-branch generalized Feistel structure with nibble-wise computations is shown in Figure 1 . Assuming that all the sub-keys k i j (in which i is round number and 1 ≤ j ≤ 4) are known and the internal state of round i input is shown by
can form a cut-set. One can easily check that all the intermediate states of x i j can be computed by C members. Now, according to the idea of using cut-sets, one can choose a random cut-set as the starting state of the basic MITM attack. Naturally, any pair of plaintext/ciphertext can also be considered as an starting/ending cut-set of a block cipher. The procedure of choosing the matching variable is the same as basic MITM attack. Hence, it can be seen that in this new setting, namely generalized MITM attack, the total number of possible attacks increases approximately with the number of possible cut-sets multiples by the number of possible matching variables.
Considering a cut-set as a starting state relaxes some limitations of basic MITM attack and let an adversary take the diffusion weaknesses of the block cipher and key schedule into accout. In the other words, the chosen cut-set can be found in such a way that the associated subkeys in forward and backward directions (between the cut-set and the matching variable) result in lower time complexity.
Generalized MITM attack can be expressed in four main steps as follows:
Step 1 (Initial Selection): 1-1. Choose a random cut-set C with an arbitrary fixed value by the intermediate states of the cipher. 1-2. Choose a proper matching variable V, clearly not in the same place with any part of the chosen cutset C.
Step 2 (Pre-Processing): 2-1. Remove all the extra computations from both sides of the matching variable V which are not required for computing V from the cut-set C in forward and backward directions.
Step 3 (C to V Propagation (Perform for all Guessed Keys)): 3-1. For a chosen value of master key, perform partial encryption in forward direction from the cut-set C until computing the matching variable V as the pre-computations. If the computation of ciphertext is required, then the proper query should be sent to obtain the corresponding plaintext and then continue until the matching variable is computed. For the other guessed master keys, the recomputation technique must be used for each required bit of master key, step by step. 3-2. Perform partial decryption in backward direction from the cut-set C until computing the matching variable V similar to the forward direction.
Step 4 (Checking the guessed keys): 4-1. The matching variable values from both sides should be the same. Therefore, any guessed master key for which the matching variable values are the same for both side computations can be considered as a candidate for the correct master key. Else, the guessed key must be omitted.
It should be noted that it is possible to include the key schedule in the attack. This is usually necessary if the key schedule is not as simple as a permutation. In this scenario, first a random cut-set K with fixed value must be chosen from key schedule intermediate states as the master key K . Next, it should be propagated in both forward and backward directions of key schedule algorithm to compute all the states of key schedule or equivalently subkeys of the cipher (so in the propagation procedure, it will be obetained that which parts of the cut-set K have influenced on each subkeys; this will be used in the recomputation technique to calculate the computational complexities). Then the above procedure for generalized MITM attack can be performed. The time, memory and data complexities of generalized MITM attack can be obtained as follows:
• Time complexity: it is approximately equal to the summation of each S-box computation multiple by number of guessed master key involved in that computation, normalized to the total number of S-boxes in the cipher.
• Memory complexity: it is equal to the summation of each should-be-stored computation multiple by number of guessed directly involved bits on that computation.
• Data complexity: it is equal to the number of all the different queries during the attack. The memory complexity of the attack can be improved for each specific attack according to the conditions and the cipher and key schedule algorithms. Moreover, min (2 min 
is the number of activated plaintext (resp. ciphertext) bits by i th bit of cut-set K, can be considered as the lower bound for data complexity of the generalized MITM attack. As an example, the total procedure of generalized MITM attack on a toy cipher with simple fixed subkeys is depicted in Figure 2 . In this figure, cut-set C is shown by complete black squares and matching variable V is shown by a complete black circle. Each rectangle shows an 4 × 4 S-box combined with a subkey bit. The gray parts are the eliminated intermediate S-boxes and states. In the left-side of each Sbox the amount of its computations is shown. The influences of subkeys on some intermediate nibbles are also shown in braces.
In combination with some other ideas like early abort [6] , sieve in the middle [7] or indirect partial matching [3] techniques, the matching part of the generalized MITM attack can be more improved. Here, the focus is on partial matching and it is assumed that the attacker will use these ideas after choosing the proper condition (i.e. the cut-set and the matching variable) for the attack.
C. GENERALIZED MITM ATTACK DETAILS
The approach of generalized MITM attack is to automatically obtain the best forward and backward key bits during the attack procedure, whereas in basic MITM or biclique attack, the attacker tries to partition the master key at the beginning. That's why the initial selection step in generalized MITM attack doesn't contain the key partitioning like biclique attack. Clarifying how to perform pre-computations and recomputations in step 3, how to obtain the forward and backward key bits, and also how to execute key recovery in step 4 of generalized MITM attack are the aim of this section.
Suppose that both cut-sets of K and C, and also the matching variable V are chosen and fixed. Also, all extra computations are removed in pre-processing step. Now, attacker wants to perform the step 3. Therefore, she does the precomputations by an arbitrary chosen value for n-bit master key K = {k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k n } (which is equivalent to cut-set K).
After that, the recomputations should be performed operation by operation (e.g. S-box, XOR, etc.). Starting from C to calculate matching variable V, attacker will face various operations (no matter what the direction is). For each operation, assume that:
• all the input values are pre-computed and stored; • all bits of master key K which have influenced on the inputs are known (K in = {k i 1 , k i 2 , . . . , k i a }); • there are K o 1 = {k j 1 , k j 2 , . . . , k j b } bits of master key K which have influenced on inside, and also computational complexity of the operation;
• there are K o 2 = {k l 1 , k l 2 , . . . , k l c } bits of master key K which have influenced on inside, but not computational complexity of the operation. Then, computational complexity of the operation is equal to 2 #(K in ∪K o 1 ) (in which ∪ means union of the two set), and all bits of master key K which have influenced on the output of the operation are K out
. Afterwards, all the 2 #K out output values along with values of K out bits should be stored as pre-computations for the other operations. This procedure continues until the matching variable V will be obtained. Now, K op = (K in ∪ K o 1 ) for each active operation op from cut-set C to matching variable V in both forward and backward direction has been found. By defining all active non-linear operations as set OP, and total number of non-linear operations of the targeted block cipher as N , the normalized time complexity of the attack is equal to the following equation:
In the calculation of C time , the operations with higher m . = #K op are dominant. In order to reduce memory complexity, the pre-computations can be started from exactly before these dominant operations. Therefore, it is necessary to choose a proper M to divide the operations into dominant (with m ≥ M ) and non-dominant (with m < M ) segments. The proper M has negligible effect on time complexity while it leads to huge reduction in memory complexity.
Let 
m for backward direction). In addition, let K op * be the complementary form of K op (i.e. K op * = K − K op ). Then, forward (K f ) and backward (K b ) key bits for generalized MITM attack can be extracted according to the below:
{K op * } Normally but not necessary, M should be equal to n or n − l (in which l is the smallest word size of the block cipher) to obtain the best result. When OP
with greatest m and m < M should be considered. After obtaining K f and K b , key partitioning into four segment will be a straightforward procedure as follows:
generalized MITM attack can turn into a biclique attack (as it is mentioned in the next section), then the key partitioning for biclique attack will be K g
It should be mentioned that as in the biclique attack, forward and backward keys are considered in the biclique part (and not in the matching part), the definitions of forward and backward keys are reverse for biclique attack in comparison to generalized MITM attack.
When the master key bits are partitioned into four segments of K = (K G , K C , K F , K B ), an attacker can extract the correct master key as below:
• Perform the followings for all possible values of (K G , K C ) bits.
• For each value of K B bits, perform partial encryption from cut-set C to obtain matching variable V in forward direction by using pre-computation and recomputation technique on K F bits.
• For each value of K F bits, perform partial decryption from cut-set C to obtain matching variable V in backward direction by using pre-computation and recomputation technique on K B bits.
• Compare the values of V in forward and backward direction for a fixed values of K F and K B to filter out the wrong keys.
• Exhaustive search on the remaining keys to obtain the correct master key.
The memory complexity of the attack is equal to 2 #(K F ,K B )−1 as the pre-computations in forward and backward directions should be done until the last part of K F and K B , respectively. It should be noticed that if the smallest word-size of the target block cipher is bigger than a bit, all the above mentioned in this section can be repeated with replacing bit by word and also some additional slight modifications. Consideration of words instead of bits can dramatically speed up the whole procedure.
III. COMPARISON WITH CONVENTIONAL VERSIONS OF MITM ATTACKS
In this section, it will be discussed that the generalized MITM attack can cover some previous improved versions of MITM attacks and also provides some new cases, by the following claims. Claim 1: Any basic MITM, 3-subset MITM, splice-andcut, or biclique attack is also a generalized MITM attack.
For the sake of the mentioned claim, some descriptions for each attack are provided one by one as follows (see Figure 3 for more details):
• Basic MITM attack: let C be equal to P (or equivalently C) and V equal to the matching variable of the basic MITM attack. Now, the generalized MITM attack and the basic MITM attack are exactly the same.
• 3-subset MITM attack: generally, the 3-subset MITM attack removes restrictions on the choice of key bits compared to the basic MITM attack. Therefore, there is no change in the main procedure, and the description provided for the basic MITM attack works for the 3subset MITM attack too.
• Splice-and-cut attack: considering the internal state of splice-and-cut as cut-set C, the remaining parts of both splice-and-cut and generalized MITM attack are the same.
• Biclique attack: according to [17] for any biclique attack, a cut-set, namely root cut-set, can be found in the biclique part which has not been affected by both forward and backward differentials. Considering that cutset equal to C and similar matching variable for a generalized MITM attack as the biclique attack, then the biclique attack can be completely the same as the generalized MITM attack. Claim 2: There are some cases which can be covered by the generalized MITM attack, but not by the previous MITM attacks
It must be shown that not any generalized MITM attack can be presented by one of the previous MITM attacks. Choosing the cut-set C in a way that its variables be in more than one internal state leads to a new case which cannot be covered by basic MITM, 3-subset MITM, and splice-and-cut attacks. Considering such a cut-set, the generalized MITM attack can be applied with any cut-set as the starting state regardless of its position, while in biclique attack as the biclique part is always in the first or last rounds of the cipher, the root cutset of biclique cannot be anywhere. In addition, the biclique is always between two round states, but using generalized MITM attack, this condition is removed and actually the biclique can be between two cut-sets. Therefore, generalized MITM attack can cover some new cases in comparison to the previous MITM attack variants (see Figure 3 ).
It can be concluded from the above claims (III and III) that providing security against generalized MITM attack ensures the security against the other mentioned MITM attacks. Also it should be mentioned that the generalized MITM attack does not rely on what the method of wrong keys filtering in the matching part is. Hence, it is clearly possible to use any idea such as early abort, sieve in the middle or indirect partial matching techniques instead of simple matching variable check to have more effective attacks.
IV. AUTOMATION OF GENERALIZED MITM ATTACK
Generalized MITM attack provides a lot of cases which should be investigated to find the best one. Clearly, the total number of possible generalized MITM attacks is more than the ability of a cryptanalyst to check them all manually. Hence, an automated method for searching around all these attacks and providing the best one is required. In this section, the goal is to introduce the exact search algorithms required for this automation. So, first a method for defining a block cipher with emphasis on its diffusion property is provided in the following sub-section, and then algorithms required for total procedure of generalized MITM attack are presented.
A. BLOCK CIPHER DIFFUSION
Diffusion of block cipher and key schedule algorithms has a key role on measuring the effectiveness of generalized MITM attack. Therefore, providing a proper model for analysis of diffusion in these algorithms shed light on how to automate the total procedure of generalized MITM attack. Any block cipher (or key schedule) algorithm can be considered as a set of internal states along with relations between these internal states. More precisely, suppose that a block cipher algorithm consists of srow internal states, each with scol words, and also its corresponding key schedule has krow internal states, each with keysize words (the variables are shown in the italic form; scol and keysize are equivalent to block and key sizes, respectively). In the diffusion perspective, one should know which of the previous or next internal state words are required to compute a current state word in forward and backward direction, respectively. Hence, the following knowledges about relations between current internal state words and previous/next internal state words should be determined: These knowledge can be accurately obtained and stored in the following arrays:
1) CFP(1 : srow − 1, 1 : scol, 1 : 9): a 3-dimensional (srow − 1) × scol × 9 array to show the place of each operation and its nine parameters; consists of length (greater than 0 for each operation), total complexity (between 0 and 1; 0 for linear operations and 1 for nonlinear operations), subkey words (according to values of this parameter, the subkey words are chosen from the current internal state of the key schedule), update flag (0 means the selected internal state of the key schedule must not be updated; 1 means it must be updated), effects of subkey words on computational complexity (between 0 and 1), computational complexity of input/output words calculation (between 0 and 1), and calculation effects of input/output words on computational complexity (between 0 and 1). As an example, CFP array elemets for a Left Feistel S-box operation are shown in the Figure 4 . This operation is placed between 5 th and 6 th internal state and it has two-word length started from word 1. Therefore, CFP(5, 1, 1) should be equal to 2 which means that in the corresponding place, there is an operation with length 2. Also, the total complexity of this operation is equal to 1 S-box operation. Subkey words are {4, 0} which means that the first subkey word is 4 th word of current internal state of key schedule and the second one is empty (or equivalently, this subkey has only one word). Update flag is 0, because Toy block cipher in Figure 4 has not key schedule. The one-word corresponding subkey directly affects on S-box calculation. Therefore, CFP(5, 1 : 2, 5) should be equal to {1, 0}. Also, the subkey only affects on the left word of output and input in both forward and backward direction, respectively. So, CFP(5, 1 : 2, 6) and CFP(5, 1 : 2, 7) are both equal to {1, 0}. In addition, the left input and output words of the operation have not effect on S-box calculation, while the right input and output words can directly activate the S-box. Therefore, CFP(5, 1 : 2, 8) and CFP(5, 1 : 2, 9) should be both equal to {0, 1}. 2) CF(1 : srow − 1, 1 : scol, 1 : scol, 1 : 4): Four 3dimensional (srow − 1) × scol × scol boolean arrays to show the effects of input words on output words of an operation and vice versa, and also effects of subkey words on output and input words of that operation, respectively. In fact, CF simulate the diffusion property of each operation in block cipher. For example, when the second word of i th internal state has affect on the first word of (i + 1) th internal state in forward direction, then CF(i, 1, 2, 1) is equal to 1. In Figure 4 , these four arrays for a two-word Left Feistel S-box are shown. 3) Similar arrays with CFP and CF for key schedule, namely KFP and KF, respectively. For KFP array, the elements related to subkey words, update flag and subkey effects are all zero. 4) CFK (1 : srow − 1, 1 : scol, 1 : keysize): a 3-dimensional (srow − 1) × scol × keysize boolean array to show the master key words which have influenced on the operations of the cipher. More precisely, the place of subkey words in the current internal state of key schedule for each operation is stored by CFP(i, j, 3) in which 1 ≤ i ≤ srow − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ scol, and the set of master key words which have influence on each subkey word is provided by CFK (i, j : j + CFP(i, j, 1) − 1, 1 : keysize). In Figure 4 , with i = 5, j = 1, CFP(5, 1, 1) = 2 and keysize = 4, the value of CFK (5, 1 : 2, 1 : 4) for a Left Feistel S-box is shown. 5) K _Marked(1 : krow): a boolean array to show which internal states of the key schedule must be used for extracting the subkeys. Hence, CFK is calculated from key schedule internal states (i.e. KSK in the following) with update flags and K _Marked. At the beginning, the first internal state of key schedule with true K _Marked is considered as the current state for key schedule. Then CFK for each operation should be obtained from this state until the update flag of an operation will be true. In this situation, before obtaining CFK for the next operation, the next internal state of key schedule with true K _Marked should be considered. This procedure will continue until all operations obtain their subkeys. More precisely, it can be said that CFK (i, j : j + CFP(i, j, 1) − 1, 1 : keysize) is exactly equal to KSK (selected_Krow, CFP(i, j : j + CFP(i, j, 1) − 1, 3), 1 : keysize) in which the selected_Krow should be obtained by consideration of update flags (i.e. CFP(., ., 4)) and K _Marked.
The above knowledge are important to define a block cipher for the automation of generalized MITM attack. However, some additional knowledge are required to perform the attack. These knowledges which should have initial values and be updated during the attack procedure, are as below:
• The active words in each internal states • Effect of each master key word on each internal state word • Direction of activation for each operation They can be defined and stored accurately as follows: 1) CS(1 : srow, 1 : scol): a 2-dimensional srow × scol array to show the situation of all the internal state words of block cipher algorithm or equivalently input/output words of each operation (0 means it is not activated, 1 means it is activated, and -1 means it is eliminated).
The initial values for whole of CS array elements are 0, and at the end of generalized MITM attack, all elements should be 1 or −1. In Figure 4 , CS elements for a Left Feistel S-box are shown. of these arrays. 4) Checking the guessed keys: similar to Section II-C. In the following section, the automation method for generalized MITM attack on a target block cipher by the mentioned arrays is provided.
B. ALGORITHMS FOR TOTAL PROCEDURE
In order to automate the generalized MITM attack, the following steps should be considered, respectively:
Step 1 (Initial Selection):
• Providing the notion of point and independent points in block ciphers.
• Introducing the approach of constructing cut-sets by independent points.
• Proposing Exhaustive Recursive Search (ERS) to find cut-sets of a block cipher.
• Choosing a point as the matching variable V.
Step 2 (Pre-Processing):
• Presenting Elimination Algorithm to remove all the extra computations in the matching part.
Step 3 (C to V Propagation):
• Providing the propagation algorithm to obtain the effects of master key words on each intermediate variable and operation between C and V.
• Presenting an algorithm for calculating the complexities (time, memory and data). It should be emphasized that the target of automation is calculating the attack complexities, not implementing the attack. Hence, the last step of generazlied MITM attack (i.e. checking the guessed keys) is not necessary for automation. Of course, an attacker can utilize the corresponding parameters of the best attack to perform the key recovery according to Section II-C.
1) INITIAL SELECTION
Considering all of the smallest intermediate variables (or words) for finding cut-sets of a block cipher makes extra complexity and redundancy, while it has no gain for this goal. For example, input and output word of a permutation have the same property, and there is no difference between them to select for a cut-set. Therefore, notion of point is provided to remove these extra cases and present unique answers, as follows:
Definition 2 (Point): A set of all the smallest intermediate variables or words (i.e. indexes of CS) with the exact same values in the cipher is called a point. Therefore, all the indexes in a point have always the same CS and CSK values.
As an example, I 2 = CS (5, 2) and O 2 = CS(6, 2) are in one point in Figure 4 , while I 1 = CS(5, 1) and O 1 = CS (6, 1) are in different points. It can be seen that a point is a union of words, each can be obtained from the others by at most a permutation. The toy cipher which is shown in Figure 4 has the following 20 points:
By reminding Definition 1, if any two bits (or equivalently two words) of a cut-set be on one point, then they can be calculated from each other. This has contradiction with the notion of cut-set which choose the lowest possible words in order to perform encryption/decryption assumed that the master key is given. Therefore, any two words of a chosen cut-set must be in different points. Hence, without loss of generality, it can be said that any cut-set with b words can be shown by b distinctive points. This opens new insights in obtaining cut-sets of a cipher. Firstly, it omits many identical cut-sets which include the same points but different intermediate variables. Secondly, it shows a determinestic method for acceptance or rejection of any given set of b distinctive points as a cut-set. More precisely, if all the given b points are independet from each other, then they must construct a cut-set. Independency of two points is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Independency of Two Points P and Q): P and Q are independent points in a block cipher, if and only if Q ∈ Independent(P), which is described below:
1. In forward (resp. backward) direction, find all variables (not points) required for calculating P by CF(.) and mark them all. 2. Repeat marking for newly marked variables until the ciphertext (resp. plaintext);
Return the smallest set of points containing all the unmarked variables as Independent(P)
It can be easily checked that if Q ∈ Independent(P) then P ∈ Independent(Q). As an example of independent points, consider point P 8 in the Toy cipher of Figure 4 , then Independent(P 8 ) = {P 4 , P 5 , P 6 , P 9 , P 10 , P 11 , P 12 , P 13 , P 14 }. With considering more than two points, the independency of these points can be interpreted as independency of all chosen pairs of them. Therefore, in order to find all cut-sets of a block cipher, one method can be finding of all possible b independent points in it. This is done by a proposed recursive algorithm (namely ERS) starting from basic input points (for example all points involved in block cipher) which is provided in Algorithm 1. The main procedure of ERS is as follows:
1. Choose a new point P from a set of InputPoints; 2. Add P to a set of points C;
3. If C has b member, then provide C as a cut-set, and remove P from it; 4. Else set InputPoints = Independent(P) and repeat the procedure. Algorithm 1 can be more accelerated with some middle checks. These checks come from the inherent fact that all common points of a chosen cut-set with input or output points of an intermediate function, must not breach the independency condition for that intermediate function. Therefore, during the search for cut-sets, this independency condition can be checked for all relevant intermediate functions and wrong cut-sets can be dropped more quickly. This checking algorithm which should be used in the place of optional checks in ERS algorithm (i.e. Algorithm 1), is provided in Algorithm 2.
Hence, cut-sets of a determined block cipher can be found by combination of Algorithms 1 and 2. In addition, as the matching variable V description can also be modified to the matching point P V , all possible matching points are equivalent to all points of the block cipher.
These proposed algorithms can also be performed on key schedule to extract its cut-sets. Clearly, any cut-set of key schedule can be considered as the master key words. Then, according to this chosen master key and key schedule algorithm, the effects of master key on subkey words should be found and inserted into the block cipher.
2) PRE-PROCESSING
The elimination procedure for removing extra intermediate variables and functions of partial matching can be provided as follows:
• In forward (resp. backward) direction, find all points required for calculating the P V by CF(.) and mark them all.
• Repeat marking for newly marked points until the ciphertext (resp. plaintext);
• Return all the unmarked points as Elimination(P V ) Hence, Elimination(P V ) indicates the points which should be removed. Considering a cut-set as b independent points, it can be easily checked that there are only two cut-sets while m < Length(Points) do 10: Set m = m + 1 and then P = Points(m) 11: Set CS(P) = value All CS(i, j) with {i, j} ∈ P must be set to value.
12:
Set all {Q|Q ∈ Points, Q / ∈ Independent(P), CS(Q) = 0} to value + scol 13: Add P to cutset 14: Do an optional check for extracting the flag (the default flag is zero) 15: if (flag == 0) then 16: if (value < scol) then 17: Set NewPoints = Independent(P) 18: if (Length(NewPoints) >= scol − value) then 19: cutset = ERS(NewPoints, value + 1, cutset) 20: end if 21: else 22: Set cutsetnumber = cutsetnumber + 1 23: Add cutset into cutsets 24: end if 25: end if 26: Remove P from cutset 27: ∀{Q|CS(Q) = value + scol}, set CS(Q) back to 0 28: Add P to Rec ∀X ∈ Rec Set CS(X ) = 0 36: end procedure constructed by unremoved points containing matching point P V , namely C P and C C , in the plaintext-side and ciphertextside of P V , respectively (see matching part of Figure 2 as an example). These cut-sets will be used in the propagation procedure.
3) C TO V PROPAGATION
The procedure of finding the number of effective master key words on each intermediate function and variable, starting from a chosen cut-set C to another arbitrary cutset C 2 in forward or backward direction, is called propagation. After choosing a matching P V , two cut-sets of C P and C C are obtained. Hence, C to V propagation refer to union of propagations from C to C P and C C , in forward and backward direction, respectively. It is a direct procedure with the simple algorithm as Algorithm 3 for forward direction. Though Algorithm 3 is presented for a block cipher algorithm in forward direction, it can also be used directly on the key schedule (of course, there is not any match point in the key schedule). For the backward direction, the general procedure is similar to forward direction.
If Algorithm 3 is performed on the key schedule, it must not continue after reaching the first or last key schedule state, while for performing on the cipher, it should continue until all intermediate functions/operations in foward (or backward) direction are considered. After performing propagation algorithm, all the arrays are ready to compute the time complexity which is presented in Algorithm 4.
It should be mentioned that the time complexity of the key schedule in Algorithm 4 can be obtained with the same procedure of Algorithm 4 but on the key schedule. In addition, the lower bound for data complexity can be achieved by Set A as all outputs of F which require the Point to be calculated in Dir direction 6: Set Xpass = 0, and Xin = 0 7: for x ∈ A do 8: Set B as all the inputs of F which have effect on x in Dir direction 9: Set X 0 = number of B input elements with values of greater equal than zero 10: if X 0 == length(B) then 11: Set Xpass = Xpass + 1 12: end if 13: end for 14: Set C as all inputs of F which have effect on at least one member of A 15: Set Xin = number of C input elements with values of greater equal than zero 16: if (Xin > Xpass && C has at least one input element with positive value) then Set j = 1 6: while j <= scol do 7: if CS(i, j) == 1 then 8: Set A = every CS(i + 1, .) index which is influenced by CS(i, j) 9: for a ∈ A which CS(i + 1, a) == 0 do 10: if all required CS(i, .) for calculation of CS(i + 1, a) are equal to 1 then 11: Set CS(P) = 1 in which CS(i + 1, a) ∈ point P 12: Set CSK (P, .) according to CF, CFK , and CSK 13: end if 14: end for 15: end if 16: if All the inputs of the intermediate function is 1 then 17: Set CDir of the intermediate function in CFP(.) (1 for forward direction) 18: j = end of internal function 19: end if 20: Set j = j + 1 21: end while 22 : end for 23: if CS(ciphertext) == 1 && CS(plaintext) == 0 then 24: Set CS(plaintext) = 1 25: Repeat the above procedure again 26: end if the minimum number of activated plaintext/ciphertext words when all the master key words are considered one by one (see Figure 2 as an example). There is an additional input in Algorithm 4, namely Vector. It is leveraged for separation of pre-determined key words from unknown ones. So, it can be used for not considering some pre-determined key words in the attack complexity with the assumption that they should be guessed before. These pre-determined key words can be group or common key bits, defined in Section II-C. Hence, by arrangement of Vector for some key words with fewest Find all points of the cipher and store them in Points 3: Choose a random cut-set in key schedule as the main key bits and calculate all the subkeys with performing the propagation algorithm on the key schedule 4: Find all cut-sets of the cipher according to Algorithms 1 and 2 and store them in cutsets 5: for P V ∈ Points do 6: Set extra_points = Elimination(P V ) 7: for C ∈ cutsets do 8: if C has not any common points with extra_points and P V then 9: Set CS(.) = 0 10: Set CS(extra_points) = −1 11: Set CS(C) = 1 12: Propagate C in both directions until P V using Algorithm 3 13: Calculate computational complexity by Algorithm 4 14: Save the results 15: end if 16: end for 17: end for S-box activation in forward and backward direction between cut-set C and point P V , the attack time and data complexities can be exactly re-calculated while the memory complexity of the attack can also be obtained from total number of chosen forward and backward key words minus one. For purpose of finding lower time complexity bound, Vector should be set as a total one array with keysize length.
4) AUTOMATION PROCEDURE
According to the all above mentioned algorithms, the generalized MITM attack can be proposed by a fully automated procedure as Algorithm 5.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, the results of automated generalized MITM attack on various block ciphers are presented. The targeted ciphers are HIGHT [18] and Piccolo-128 [19] as Feistel block ciphers, and CRAFT [20] , and AES-128 [21] as SPN block ciphers. The block size of HIGHT, Piccolo-128 and CRAFT are 64-bit length, while AES-128 has 128-bit block length. On the other hand, HIGHT, Piccolo-128 and AES-128 have byte-wise calculations (8-bit word size), while CRAFT has nibble-wise calculations (4-bit word size). All the block ciphers have a 128-bit master key shown by K = (K 0 , K 1 , . . . , K i−1 ) in which i = 128 wordsize − 1. More details of these block ciphers including key schedules are provided in [18] - [21] , and, the overall schematics along with internal layers of them are depicted in Figure 5 . • According to its simple key schedule, any random chosen cut-set in the key schedule has the same results. Therefore, without loss of generality, the master key is chosen for that cut-set. • There are 144 points, 6162 cut-sets, and 601928 possible attacks (considering all acceptable combination of matching points and cut-sets). • Minimum time complexity of these attacks is equal to 2 125.3947 (see Figure 6 ), which is obtained by C 1 = (X 2 18 , X 0 20 , X 2 20 , X 2 22 , X 6 22 , X 2 24 , X 4 24 , X 2 26 ) and V 1 = X 6 50 . • By C 1 and V 1 , an attack A 1 with time, memory and data complexities of 2 125.399 , 2 32 and 2 64 can be obtained by (K 7 , K 8 ) and (K 3 , K 9 , K 10 ) as forward and backward subkeys, respectively. It should be emphasized that the best known time complexity for full HIGHT was 2 125.67 before [22] .
• Considering cut-set C 2 = (X 1 1 , X 7 1 , X 0 2 , X 2 2 , X 6 2 , X 2 4 , X 4 4 , X 2 6 ) and matching variable V 2 = X 4 32 , another attack A 2 with attack number of 294740 can be obtained by (K 2 , K 3 , K 10 ) and (K 4 , K 7 ) as forward and backward subkeys, respectively. The time, memory and data complexities of the attack are equal to 2 125.4658 , 2 32 and 2 32 , respectively. The details of attack A 2 are also depicted in Figure 10 . In this figure, the more thicker line, the more subkeys affected. The influence of chosen forward and backward subkeys on F-functions are shown on the top of each F-function. The light gray lines and functions are also removed in the attack procedure.
2) ENHANCEMENT OF PARTIAL MATCHING ON HIGHT ALGORITHM
By some improvements in the matching part, the attack results can be more enhanced. More precisely, the computation parts which are surrounded by dashed lines in Figure 10 can be performed in a bit-wise manner, from the least significant bit (LSB) to the most significant bit (MSB). This early abort idea makes filtering out the wrong keys faster by dropping them at the first time which a bit of matching variable is not matched from the both side. As the computation of each bit of the matching variable requires only one output bit of the all F-functions which have influenced on the dashed line parts, the complexity of computing this output bit of each F-function is only 2 −3 F-function, referring to F-functions details in [18] . Therefore, according to early abort technique, the computational complexity of these F-functions should be 2 −3 (1 + 2 −1 + · · · + 2 −7 ) < 2 −2 instead of 1 for each attack. This technique can be applied on matching part of all generalized MITM attacks on HIGHT. The results for attack A 1 and A 2 are as follows:
• As there are 5 F-functions involved in bit-wise matching part of A 1 which activated by all subkeys, considering the bit-wise matching part results in reducing 5 × (1 − 2 −2 ) 128 2 128 = 2 122.907 of A 1 time complexity. Therefore, the time complexity of attack A 1 will be equal to 2 125.399 − 2 122.907 = 2 125.116 . • It can be seen in Figure 10 that there are 7 F-functions involved in bit-wise matching part of A 2 which activated by all subkeys. Therefore, considering the bit-wise matching part results in reducing 7 × (1 − 2 −2 ) 128 2 128 = 2 123.392 of A 2 time complexity. Therefore, A 2 time complexity will be equal to 2 125.4658 − 2 123.392 = 2 125.075 . Surprizingly, the final time and data complexities of attack A 2 after considering bit-wised matching part are less than attack A 1 . In addition, considering 4-MSB of chosen subkeys in forward and backward directions (similar to [17] ) leads to lower data and memory complexities of 2 24 and 2 16 for attack A 2 while the new time complexity will be 2 125.2 .
B. PICCOLO-128 1) GENERALIZED MITM ATTACK ON PICCOLO-128
Applying generalized MITM attack on Piccolo-128 results in the followings:
• According to its simple key schedule, any random chosen cut-set in the key schedule has the same results. Therefore, without loss of generality, the master key is chosen for that cut-set.
• There are 140 points, 1461 cut-sets, and 175156 possible attacks for Piccolo-128 block cipher algorithm.
• Minimum time complexity of these attacks is equal to 2 126.8795 (see Figure 7 ), which is obtained by V 1 = X 2 4 and C 1 = (X 6 24 , X 7 24 , X 2 26 , X 3 26 , X 6 26 , X 7 26 , X 6 28 , X 7 28 ). • With the above cut-set C 1 and matching variable V 1 , an attack A 1 with memory of 2 24 can be obtained by (K 10 , K 11 ) = (k 5 L , k 5 R ) and (K 12 , K 13 ) = (k 6 L , k 6 R ) as forward and backward subkeys, respectively. The time and data complexities of attack A 1 are also equal to 2 126.8795 and 2 64 , respectively. It should be emphasized that the best known time complexity for full Piccolo-128 was 2 127.12 before [17] . Considering 4-MSB of chosen subkeys in forward and backward directions and going through details of Piccolo-128 F-function computations as in [17] leads to approximately reduction of two dominant F-functions computations and new time, memory and data complexities of 2 126.78 , 2 12 and 2 64 for attack A 1 , respectively.
• By choosing cut-set C 2 = (X 2 56 , X 3 56 , X 2 58 , X 3 58 , X 6 58 , X 7 58 , X 2 60 , X 3 60 ) and matching variable V 2 = X 2 12 , another attack A 2 with attack number of 35302 can be obtained with (k 6 L , k 6 R ) and (k 3 L , k 3 R ) as forward and backward subkeys, respectively (see Figure 7) . The time, memory and data complexities of the attack A 2 are equal to 2 127.0689 , 2 24 and 2 48 , respectively. Similar to attack A 1 , considering 4-MSB of chosen subkeys and going through details of Piccolo-128 F-function computations leads to new time, memory and data complexities of 2 127 , 2 12 and 2 40 for attack A 2 , respectively.
• Trying to find attacks with data complexity of equal to 2 8 or less results in some attacks with the same complexities which one of them is exactly the one in [17] . This shows that the algorithm of ''low data complexity biclique cryptanalysis of block cipher'' in [17] and the algorithm of ''generalized MITM attack'' with the condition of low data complexity on Piccolo-128 have the same results.
C. CRAFT 1) GENERALIZED MITM ATTACK ON CRAFT • AES key schedule is not as simple as key schedule of previous block ciphers and any cut-set in it can be considered as the master key with different effects on subkeys. When the cut-set of sixth 128-bit subkey (K 6 ) is considered as the master key, there is no activated S-box by all bytes of this subkey in the key schedule.
Hence, it can be a good choice for generalized MITM attack as the computational complexity of key schedule can be ignored in this situation.
• There are 336 different points in AES-128 block cipher algorithm. However, there are millions of cut-sets which can be made by these points. Therefore, a similar method as CRAFT is used for sieving these cut-sets. Applying this idea on cut-set finder algorithm results in 267 different cut-sets and 60256 possible attacks for AES-128 block cipher algorithm.
• Minimum time complexity of these attacks is equal to 2 125.5295 (see Figure 9 ), which is obtained by V 1 = X 0 4 and C 1 = (X 0 20 , X 4 20 , X 12 20 , X 1 21 , X 3 21 , X 5 21 , X 6 21 , X 9 21 , X 10 21 , X 11 21 , X 14 21 , X 15 21 , X 8 24 , X 9 25 , X 10 25 , X 11 25 ). This complexity is less than what has been found before in [23] .
• Using C 1 and V 1 , an attack A 1 with time, memory and data complexities of 2 125.5696 , 2 32 and 2 128 can be obtained by (K 9 6 , K 10 6 , K 11 6 ) and (K 0 6 , K 12 6 ) as forward and backward subkeys, respectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the generalized MITM attack is proposed and automated by searching around cut-sets of a block cipher. Then, it is applied on four different block cipher, HIGHT and Piccolo-128 with Feistel structure, and CRAFT and AES with SPN structure. The results show some improvements in comparison to previous works. As an example, generalized MITM attack along with bit-wised matching part on HIGHT has found an attack with time, memory and data complexities of 2 125.2 , 2 16 and 2 24 , which has less time and data complexities than the previous work on full-round HIGHT [22] , with time, memory and data complexities of 2 125.67 , 2 16 and 2 42 , respectively. In addition, generalized MITM attack on Piccolo-128 has found the same result as [17] when data complexity limitation is applied on the attack. Also, generalized MITM attack on AES-128 approved possibility of finding out an attack with less time complexity than the attack mentioned in [23] .
Generalized MITM attack on block ciphers can be performed along with some other ideas such as early abort, sieve in the middle, or innovative techniques to improve the attack results. As an example, in the attack on full HIGHT, considering the idea of bit-wised matching part along with 4-MSB bits of subkeys leads to a new attack with interesting results in which all the complexities of the attack are lower than or equal to the best previous known attack. Another example is in the attack on CRAFT which is a tweakable block cipher. Generalized MITM attack on CRAFT along with improved exhaustive search introduced in [20] leads to a new attack with lower time complexity of 2 123.25 in comparsion to 2 124 of designer's analysis. It should be highlighted that the genealized MITM attack can cover almost all previous versions of MITM attack including biclique attack. Therefore, providing security against generalized MITM attack can confirm the security against these previous versions. Another advantage of generalized MITM attack is automatic key partitioning during the attack procedure.
